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Abstract
This study investigates the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on trade mode choices
among assembly firms. Using the Chinese Customs data from 2000 to 2006, we show
that exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) depends on which entity is responsible for
importing inputs. Relative to passively receiving inputs under pure assembly (PA)
mode, foreign invested assembly firms mainly source inputs by themselves through
import and assembly (IA) mode and enjoy lower ERPT by doing so. We then relate
exchange rate fluctuations to processing mode choices and find that the share of import
through PA increases with exchange rate volatilities. This effect is more pronounced
for firms in liquidity constrained industries and is mitigated by better local financial
development.
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1 Introduction
With the integration of global economies, an increasing number of production activities have
been transferred from developed to developing countries in pursuit of lower labor costs. By
participating in the multinational production network, developing countries have become an
important part of the global value chain. In 2017, processing trade in China accounts for
about one-third of the total trade value and three-quarters of total trade surplus.1 One
feature of processing trade is that the majority of inputs are imported. Assembly firms could
either source inputs and handle payments by themselves or receive inputs for free from foreign
parties to whom assembled final products are exported. High reliance on imported inputs
indicates that these assembly firms are easily exposed to exchange rate risks. Moreover,
compared to firms in ordinary trade, assembly firms are less productive and more financially
constrained (Manova and Yu, 2016) which lead to greater liquidity pressure due to exchange
rate changes. In this study, we investigate how exchange rate fluctuations affect decisions of
assembly firms to take charge of imported input sourcing.
Unlike ordinary trade where domestic importers always take charge of imported inputs
purchasing, firms doing processing trade face two options. They could obtain inputs from
foreign parties for free under pure assembly (PA) mode or purchase imported inputs and
handle related payments by themselves under import and assembly (IA) mode. Import prices
under PA mode reflect the actual transactions between input suppliers and foreign parties
who outsourced assembly tasks.
Using monthly import data at the transaction level from 2000 to 2006, we document
two stylized facts related to the assembly firms in China. First, comparisons between the
two processing modes reveal that state-owned assembly firms are more likely to engage in
PA mode while foreign invested assembly firms have larger import share through IA mode.
Second, we examine the difference of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to import prices
between the two processing modes under various ownership structures. We construct monthly
import price changes for each firm-product-country combination and relate these to the real
exchange rate movements between China and its import source countries. We find ERPT is
1According to the China General Administration of Customs report, in 2017, the value of processing trade
was 1,190 billion U.S. dollars, which accounts for 29% of China’s total trade value. The trade surplus of
processing trade was 327 billion U.S. dollars, which accounts for 77% of China’s total trade surplus.
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different depending on who is in charge of imported inputs sourcing activities. In particular,
input sourcing undertaken by state-owned assembly firms through IA experiences higher
exchange rate pass-through compared to inputs sourced by foreign parties under PA. The
difference is not statistically significant. On the contrary, among foreign invested firms, ERPT
is significantly lower if assembly firms rather than foreign parties handle input sourcing. In
other words, if we take receiving free inputs (i.e., PA) as a benchmark, foreign invested
assembly firms enjoy lower ERPT while state-owned ones face higher ERPT when they
source imported inputs by themselves.
The stylized facts suggest a correlation between firm ability to bear exchange rate risk
and processing mode choice. For example, for foreign-invested assembly firms, the ERPT is
lower when they use IA compared to PA mode. At the same time, we observe over 80% of
processing imports of foreign invested firms came under IA mode. Motivated by the stylized
facts, we further investigate whether and how exchange rate fluctuations affect the processing
mode choices among assembly firms in China. We use the standard deviation of monthly
exchange rate changes weighted by import values from each source country in the previous
year as a proxy for exchange rate volatility faced by assembly firms. We find that higher
exchange rate fluctuations lead to larger share of processing imports through PA mode. When
the exchange rate fluctuation increase one standard deviation, the import share of PA mode
would increase by 2%. Considering the average PA share is 24%, the effect of exchange
rate risk on mode choice is economically significant. The assembly firms face no exchange
rate risks when using PA mode since they passively receive imported inputs. Exchange rate
volatilities only matter when they source inputs by themselves under IA. When exchange
rate risk increases, assembly firms tend to import more using PA mode to avoid such risks.
This effect is significant for private and foreign invested firms who are more likely to react
to market conditions compared to state-owned assembly firms. Our results are robust when
we rule out trade intermediaries and using alternative exchange risk measures.
In addition, we hypothesize that the exchange rate risk avoidance behavior through pro-
cessing mode selection could be mitigated by better local financial development and is more
severe for assembly firms in liquidity constrained industries. We use loans over GDP ratio
to capture local financial development. The results show that assembly firms in regions with
better financial development are less likely to adjust exchange rate risks through more PA
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imports. They may have better alternatives to hedge risks and have access to lower bor-
rowing costs. Next, inventory to sales ratio is used to capture short-term industry liquidity
constraints. We find a stronger effect for assembly firms in industries facing higher liquidity
constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine the impact
of exchange rate fluctuation on import prices and processing mode choices among assembly
firms in developing countries. It documents sorting of assembly firms into different processing
mode based on firm ownership and explains how this relates to ERPT differences depending
on input sourcing responsibilities. Previous research examining processing mode choices focus
on property rights theory and financial constraints. This paper contributes to the literature
by offering a third explanation, exchange rate risks, for trade mode choices of assembly firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related studies. Section
3 introduces the background of China’s processing trade. Section 4 describes the data and
Section 5 studies the ERPT in import prices. In Section 6, we investigate how exchange rate
risk affect the choices of processing trade modes. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Three strands of literature are related to this study. The first strand addresses the choice of
processing trade modes. Some studies analyze these choices from the perspective of foreign
parties and use the property right theory of the firm (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005; Fernandes
and Tang, 2012) to explain foreign parties’ decisions on controlling imported inputs pur-
chasing. These studies argue that foreign parties prefer internalization (PA mode) because
ownership of inputs is a source of power when contracts are incomplete. Other studies use
the financial constraint (Manova and Yu, 2016) to explain the choice of processing trade
modes from the perspective of assembly firms. These works find that limited access to capi-
tal prevents assembly firms upgrading from PA mode to IA mode. In this study, we present
a third possible mechanism to explain the sourcing decisions of firms from the perspective
of exchange rate risks. In PA mode assembly firms are free of exchange rate risks, and thus
they prefer PA mode if they face higher exchange rate fluctuations. We empirical results
show that, relative to foreign parties, state-owned assembly firms bear similar exchange rate
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risks while joint-owned or foreign-owned assembly firms bear less exchange rate risks. Thus,
the exchange rate risk mechanism could explain that state-owned assembly firms have higher
proportions in PA mode than joint-owned or foreign-owned assembly firms do.
The second strand of literature is related to the impact of exchange rate fluctuations
on prices and margins of trade. Pioneer research investigate import price responses over
time at the aggregate product-country level and provide evidence on partial ERPT (e.g.,
Campa and Goldberg (2005); Gopinath et al. (2010)). With the availability of firm level
information, many studies focus on the firm responses of exchange rate fluctuations. For
example, Amiti et al. (2014) demonstrate the ERPT of Belgian exporters is correlated with
their import intensities. Most of these papers focus on the responses of exporters (e.g., Tang
and Zhang (2012); Li et al. (2015a); Berman et al. (2012)). Li et al. (2015b) is an exception
and their paper shows that the import response of Chinese firms to exchange rate fluctuations
with OECD countries is incomplete and declining since 2001. Our paper differs from this
literature by exploring heterogeneous ERPT due to firm characteristics. In particular, we
examine assembly firms in processing trade and compare the pass-through between PA and
IA modes motivated by their innate risk bearing capabilities.
The third strand of literature studies how financial conditions affect firms’ responses to
exchange rate fluctuations. Strasser (2013) finds that the ERPT of financially constrained
firms is almost twice that of unconstrained firms. He´ricourt and Poncet (2013) find that a
firm’s exported value decreases for destinations with higher exchange rate volatility and this
effect is magnified for financially vulnerable firms. Thus, these studies argue that financially
constraint firms are more likely to be affected by exchange rate fluctuations. As Manova and
Yu (2016) show, assembly firms in China are more likely to be financially constrained. Thus,
they have incentives to mitigate the impact of exchange rate fluctuations. Usually firms
can employ three kinds of tools: operation hedging strategies, financial hedging strategies,
and direct pass-through to customers. Bartram et al. (2010) find that pass-through and
operational hedging both reduce exchange rate exposure by 10−15% while financial hedging
decreases exposure by about 40%. Do¨hring (2008) and Takatoshi et al. (2013) investigate
the exchange rate risk management of European firms and Japanese firms respectively. In
this study, we find another channel for assembly firms to avoid exchange rate risks: Engaging
in PA mode. Firms’ choices into PA mode is more pronounced in financially constraint
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industries and less prevalent in regions with better financial development further supports
our argument.
3 Background
In the processing trade, assembly firms in China obtain inputs from abroad, process them
locally, and then export the value-added goods. Most assembly firms do not have their own
brands or responsibility for marketing in foreign countries. Thus, these assembly firms are
in charge of the production process only.
There are two processing trade modes in China: PA and IA. The distinction is that in
PA mode, the assembly firm does not take ownership of either the imported inputs or the
value-added goods, and hence, plays a fairly passive role. The value-added the firm creates
is only the processing service fee. By comparison, in IA mode, the assembly firm plays a
more active role, because it controls the imported inputs purchasing and owns the imported
inputs and value-added goods.
Figure 1 shows the production chains for PA and IA modes. First, the assembly firm
in China signs a production contract with a foreign party. Then, these firms decide which
among them is in charge of the imported inputs. In PA mode, the foreign party purchases
the inputs and then transfers them to the assembly firm in China for free. Although the
inputs are free, the foreign party still needs to report the values of these inputs to Chinese
Customs. This is the “import price” observed in the customs data. In IA mode, an assembly
firm in China purchases inputs by itself. After processing these inputs, the assembly firm
either returns or sells the value-added goods to the foreign party. This is the “export price”
observed in the customs data. Thus, in PA mode, the foreign party outsources only the
assembly process but controls the purchase of inputs. Meanwhile, in IA mode, the foreign
party outsources both the assembly process and the purchase of inputs.
In Chinese Customs data, we can observe the prices between foreign parties and assembly
firms in PA mode and the prices between imported inputs suppliers and assembly firms in
IA mode. Unfortunately, we cannot directly observe the prices between imported inputs
suppliers and foreign parties. However, it is reasonable to assume that foreign parties do not
have incentive to misreport the costs of imported inputs to Chinese Customs. First, in PA
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mode, the imported inputs belong to foreign parties. Hence, it is not necessary for them to
hide the price information from assembly firms. In some legal disputes, the foreign parties
might have incentive to inflate the prices to obtain more compensation. If the inflation is a
fixed markup to the real price and not related to the exchange rate fluctuations, it will not
affect ERPT since inflated margins canceled out when we take first differences. The price
inflation could be related to the exchange rate fluctuations when foreign parties have higher
incentives to misreport during Chinese yuan depreciations. In this case, the ERPT in PA
mode is overestimated. Second, imports and exports are tariff-free for the processing trade
in China. Foreign parties cannot obtain tariff benefits from misreporting to the Chinese
Customs. Third, assembly firms charge only processing service fees in PA mode. Foreign
parties cannot evade corporate tax by misreporting import or export prices. However, if the
imported inputs supplier and foreign parties belong to the same multinational firm, then the
foreign party has incentive to misreport the import or export prices for tax benefits. Owing
to data limitations, we cannot discuss intra-firm trade concerns in this study. Hereafter, we
assume that the price between imported inputs suppliers and foreign parties is the same as
the transfer price between foreign parties and assembly firms in China. Thus, in both PA
and IA modes, the import prices measure the costs of imported inputs. This enables us
to investigate how assembly firms in China and foreign parties react to the exchange rate
fluctuation, respectively.
Another concern is the misreport problem in IA mode. Since the imported inputs in
the processing trade are tariff-free, assembly firms in China have incentive to sell imported
inputs in domestic market instead of export. In the second half of 2005, the Chinese Customs
conduct a campaign, which lasted half a year, to fight against smuggling via processing trade
(GAC, 2006). The number of cases that are found to violate the law is 5, 350 and the value
is 7.82 billion Chinese yuan, which accounts for 0.35% of total imports by processing trade
in 2005.2
In PA mode, foreign parties own value-added goods. Thus, they do not care about the
ERPT in export prices. However, since foreign parties need to import inputs from other
suppliers, they indeed care about the ERPT in import prices. In IA mode, assembly firms in
China import inputs and sell value-added goods back to foreign parties. Thus, assembly firms
2Due to data limitations, we are not able to discuss the smuggling concerns in this study.
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care about the ERPT in both import and export prices. Usually the export price is decided
when the contract is signed, after which the inputs are imported. Thus, when both foreign
parties and assembly firms import inputs, they regard the export price as given. Thus, the
ERPT in export prices would not affect the ERPT in import prices and both kinds of firms
seek low ERPT in import prices.3
4 Data
4.1 Customs Data
This study uses the “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” from 2000 to 2006,
which is reported on a monthly basis and collected by Chinese Customs. This database
includes transaction level information on export and import values, quantities, products
classified at the eight-digit harmonized system (HS) level, export destination of import source
country, firm ownership (state-owned, private-owned, joint-owned and foreign-owned),4 and
trade modes (ordinary, PA and IA). We first convert trade flows denominated in U.S. dollar
into Chinese yuan by monthly exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan. Second,
the HS code changed in 2002 at the HS6 level. In order to keep the product category
consistent, we firstly aggregate the product to the HS6 level and then convert all products
to HS1996 by using the concordance between HS2002 and HS1996. Third, this database
does not directly provide any price information. We divide the value of the product by the
quantity to obtain the unit value price at the HS6 level.
One data advantage of studying ERPT of assembly firms is that all the imported goods
should be used as intermediate inputs for production in order to qualify for tariff exemption.
In previous studies, however, some imported goods are sold in the domestic market and others
are used as intermediate inputs. It is necessary to distinguish the usage of imported goods.
In the Chinese processing trade, we do not mix the ERPT of these two kinds of imported
goods.
The customs data include all transactions of China’s processing imports from 2000 to
3We discuss the ERPT in export prices in Appendix A.1 and compare our results with existing studies.
4The joint-owned and foreign-owned firms include those with investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
Macao.
8
2006. There are more than 23 million observations, which cover 205 countries and regions
and 4, 732 products at the HS6 level. In 2000, there were 33, 275 firms engaged in the
processing trade and these firms imported goods worth 765 billion yuan. In 2006, the firm
number increased to 48, 492 and the value of imported goods increased to 2, 542 billion yuan.
Table 1 shows the number of firms and import values by processing trade modes. About
15% − 18% of firms only participate in PA mode whereas more than 70% of firms choose
purely IA mode with the rest 12% of firms participate in both. Over time, the number of
firms in each trade mode category remains stable. In terms of import value, the contribution
of pure IA importers rises over time. In 2000, about 60% of import values came from firms
engaged in pure IA mode. This number increased to almost 70% in 2006. Meanwhile, the
share of import values generated by firms doing both PA and IA decreased from 27% in
2000 to around 13% in 2006. This pattern suggests that firms participating in pure IA mode
played an increasingly important role in processing imports compared to firms experimenting
with both modes.
In Table 2, we divide firms into four ownership categories and present the import values
(and share) of PA versus IA under each ownership structure. Among state-owned firms, those
who participate in PA brought two to three times more imports compared to IA firms. In
2000, for example, about 77% of import values came from state-owned PA firms while the rest
23% belonged to state-owned IA firms. On the contrary, for joint-owned and foreign-owned
firms, imports through IA mode accounted for the majority of trade values. Specifically, over
80% of processing imports by joint or foreign owned firms were carried out in IA mode and
this share remained quite stable over our sample period. Private-owned firms seem to react
abruptly to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)5. From 2000 to 2002,
private-owned firms started doing processing trade by a tiny scale, i.e., 6.3 billion in total
compared to over 200 billion yuan done by state-owned firms in 2002. And most processing
imports of private firms came in IA mode during this period. After trade liberalization, the
processing imports by private-owned firms boomed. Most of the processing imports done
by private firms came from PA mode at first while gradually gravitated towards IA as firms
gained more experience.
Next, we compare the two processing trade modes, PA versus IA, from three aspects:
5China became a member of WTO on 11 December 2001.
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source of origin, firm location, and product variety. Panel A of Table 3 shows the top six
origin countries and regions. Four of them are developed economies in East Asia. Mainland
China also appears as one of the top origins since inputs purchased from bonded areas are
counted as imports from China. The role of China resembles a processing platform which
imports intermediate goods from nearby East Asian economies and assembles parts into final
goods which are then being exported. In Panel B of Table 3, we find that more than 94%
of assembly firms are located in the eight coastal provinces (out of 32 provinces in Mainland
China). In particular, assembly firms in Guangdong account for almost half of the processing
imports for both PA and IA mode. In Panel C of Table 3, we investigate the differences of
product varieties between the two processing trade modes. The product varieties are classified
into 97 HS2 categories. For both import processing modes, products of Chapter 856 are the
primary imported inputs. They account for 32.36% of processing imports among all product
varieties in the PA mode and 45.53% in the IA mode.7
Above all, there is no significant difference between PA and IA modes in terms of source
of origin, firm location and product variety. Firm ownership, however, exhibits huge influence
on processing imports between the two modes.
4.2 Exchange Rate and CPI Data
The nominal exchange rate data and consumer price index (CPI) are collected from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) on monthly basis.8 The real exchange rate (RERjt)
between country j and China at time t is defined as the foreign currency price per Chinese
yuan (NERjt) times the ratio of Chinese CPI over foreign CPI, which is as follows:
RERjt = NERjt × CPIChina,t/CPIjt (1)
An increase in the real exchange rate (RERjt) implies an appreciation of the yuan.
Before July 2005, China peged its currency to U.S. dollar. Thus, the nominal exchange
6Chapter 85 is “electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers,
television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles.”
7We further look into the sub-categories within Chapter 85 which includes 290 products at the HS6 level.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of product import shares under PA mode on the left and IA mode on the
right. The two figures resembles each other with an import share correlation of 0.97.
8The CPI data of Australia and New Zealand are on quarterly basis. The CPI and nominal exchange rate
data of Taiwan are collected from National Statistics, Taiwan.
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rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan is fixed. However, the nominal exchange rate
between other currencies (e.g. Euro and Japanese yen) and Chinese yuan is flexible. In order
to show the sources of real exchange movements, we present the time trend of exchange rate
between China and its top 15 trade partners9 from 1999 to 2007 in Figure 3. For most trade
partners, the real and nominal exchange rates move simultaneously, which implies that the
relative CPI change is stable. The United States, Hong Kong, and Malaysia experienced a
fixed nominal exchange rate before 2005 which explains the diversion between nominal and
real exchange rate changes.10
4.3 Financial Data
In this study, we use two financial measurements: local financial development and indus-
trial liquidity constraint. In practice, it is difficult to measure local financial development
given its complexity and multi-dimensionality. This study uses the ratio between loans and
gross domestic product (GDP) to measure financial development at the prefecture level.
Loans include both enterprise and resident loans. The financial data are collected from the
“China City Statistical Yearbook” and include 287 prefectures covering the period 2003 to
2006.11 The distribution of loans/GDP remains stable over time. Thus, we use the average
loans/GDP from 2003 to 2006 to measure local financial development. A higher value of this
ratio presents a higher level of local financial development. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the
mean of loans/GDP is 0.88 and standard deviation is 0.44. The top five cities with the high-
est financial development level are Beijing, Xining, Wurumuqi, Yichuan and Haikou. All of
these cities are provincial capitals. The bottom five cities are Daqing, Kelamayi, Chongzuo,
Hezhou and Jieyang. These cities either possess abundant petroleum resources which lead
to extremely high GDP or are less developed in all aspects.
In this study, we use the ratio of inventory to sales as a proxy for industrial liquidity
constraint. A higher value of this ratio represents a higher level of external liquidity needs.
Following Raddatz (2006), we extract the firm level information from the U.S. Compustat
9In terms of import values, the top 15 sources of origin are: the United States, Euro Area, Hong Kong,
Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Russia, Taiwan, India, Australia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand and Malaysia.
10The inflation rates in India and Russia are much higher than that of China which lead to diversions in
real and nominal exchange rate movements.
11These yearbooks do not report loan data at the prefecture level before 2003.
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dataset over 2000 to 2006 period and calculate industry median of inventory to sales ratio
at the 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. We then map these SIC codes
to HS product classifications for Chinese importers whose own industries are determined by
their main exporting product. Panel B of Table 4 summarizes the distribution of liquidity
constrains for 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Tobacco, leather and primary metal
industries face the highest liquidity constraints compared to the least constrained industries
such as printing, petroleum refining and chemicals.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) provides an alternative measure of dependence on external
finance using the share of capital expenditures not financed by cash flows. As pointed out by
Raddatz (2006), this measure is more of a long-term proxy compared to the inventory-sales
ratio. It addresses the initial investment scale and duration of gestation period as causes of
financial dependence of an industry. In this study, we examine the effect of exchange rate
fluctuations on processing mode choices. We hypothesize that industries with higher liquidity
constraints are more likely to be affected by exchange rate movements. Inventory-to-sales
ratio is a better candidate to reflect industry sensitivity to short-run financial shocks.12
5 ERPT in Import Prices
In this section, we examine the ERPT in import prices. In PA mode assembly firms in China
import inputs, while in IA mode, foreign parties import inputs. Thus, it is necessary to
distinguish between the two modes and to examine the ERPT differences between them.
5.1 Benchmark Regression at the Firm-Product-Country Level
We examine the ERPT at the firm-product-country level for PA and IA modes respectively.
First, we aggregate all import transactions to the firm-HS6-country-mode level for each
month. Then we calculate the average price of each firm-HS6-country-mode unit for each
month. We conduct monthly analysis using a stacked regression following previous studies
such as Campa and Goldberg (2005); Li et al. (2015b). The benchmark regression is as
12Results using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external finance dependence can be provided
upon request.
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follows:
∆ ln(Pijk(t−1,t)) = α0 +
3∑
h=0
α1h∆ ln(RERj(t−h−1,t−h))
+
3∑
h=0
α2h∆ ln(RERj(t−h−1,t−h)) ×Modeijkt
+ α3 Modeijkt + µij + ηk + λt + ijkt
(2)
Here, Pijkt is the import price (yuan) of product i from country j for firm k at time t. RERjt
is the real exchange rate between country j and China at time t. Modeijkt is a dummy
for processing trade mode which equals 1 if the product is traded under IA mode and 0
otherwise. µij measures the product-country fixed effect, ηk measures the firm fixed effect
and λt measures the time fixed effect. We take both import prices and real exchange rate in
the first difference of log forms. In Chinese Customs data, we observe only the arrival month
of imported products at the ports. One concern is that there is a time lag between the
signing of import contracts and the arrival of those products. If the time lag is greater than
one month, then we should examine the effect of the exchange rate in the previous months
instead of in the current month. To check this problem, we include both the contemporaneous
exchange rate fluctuation and three lagged exchange rate fluctuations to examine the ERPT
at the 3-month term. The real exchange rates are measured at the country-month level and
we cluster the standard errors by country. 13
The coefficient α10 measures the short-term ERPT for PA mode while
∑3
h=0 α1h measures
the long-term ERPT for PA mode. When the yuan appreciates, the import price (yuan) is
supposed to decrease. Thus, α10 and
∑3
h=0 α1h should be negative. The coefficient α20
measures the short-term ERPT differences between the two trade modes—PA and IA, while∑3
h=0 α2h measures the long-term ERPT differences. When α20 or
∑3
h=0 α2h is negative, it
means that the ERPT is larger in IA mode. When α20 or
∑3
h=0 α2h is positive, it means that
the ERPT is larger in PA mode. The coefficient α3 measures the price change differences
between the two trade modes.
The result is presented in Table 5. In the first two columns, we present the short-term
13We also cluster the standard errors by country-month as a robustness check and the results are robust,
which are presented in Appendix A.2.
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results, that is, the responses of price adjustment to the exchange rate change at the current
month. In the last two columns, we present the long-term results, that is, the responses of
price adjustment to the exchange rate change at the current and last three months. In the
short-term, the price is sticky, which does not response to the exchange rate change. While
in the long-term, the response of price change is significant. Column 3 shows that the ERPT
is 0.2227. On average, when the yuan appreciates by 10%, the import price (yuan) decreases
by 2.227%. This result is larger than that in Li et al. (2015b). They find that the ERPT in
import prices from OECD countries is 0.052 in the processing trade and 0.127 in the ordinary
trade. In column 4, we additionally control the interaction term between the real exchange
rate and the trade mode. The result shows that the ERPT in PA mode is 0.2629. When
the yuan appreciates by 10%, the import prices (yuan) decreases by 2.629%. In IA mode,
the exchange rate pass through is lower, at 0.1948. When the yuan appreciates by 10%, the
import price (yuan) decreases by 1.948%. In summary, the result in Table 5 shows that when
assembly firms in China import inputs by themselves, they bear lower ERPT though the
ERPT difference is insignificant.
Boz et al. (2017) emphasizes the role of dollar exchange rate rather than bilateral exchange
rate in price pass-through. Most trade flow in China is invoiced in U.S. dollar.14 However,
the pricing decision is not necessary to be made in U.S. dollar. The imported goods could be
priced in source country’s currency and then the price is converted to U.S. dollar using spot
exchange rate. In order to investigate which one is more important, bilateral exchange rate or
exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan, we include both exchange rates in our
estimation. When we control both exchange rates, only bilateral exchange rate is significant.
Thus, we will focus on the bilateral exchange rate in this study. The detail is presented in
Appendix A.3.
5.1.1 Ownership
Table 2 shows that most state-owned assembly firms are engaged in PA mode while joint-
owned and foreign-owned assembly firms are engaged in IA mode. Thus, It is necessary to
examine the ERPT by ownership. The results are shown in Table 6. In the short-term, the
14China did not officially report invoicing data in U.S. dollar. The People’s Bank of China reported
invoicing data in Chinese yuan since 2009. By Ito and Chinn (2013), the share of China’s trade invoiced in
Chinese yuan is negligible in 2009.
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ERPT is still insignificant except for foreign-owned assembly firms. Hereafter, we will focus
on the long-term ERPT. For state-owned and private-owned assembly firms, the long-term
ERPT is higher in IA mode but insignificant. For joint-owned or foreign-owned assembly
firms, the long-term ERPT are both lower in IA mode. The ERPT for joint-owned assembly
firms (0.20) is only 38% of ERPT for foreign parties (0.52) while the ERPT for foreign-
owned assembly firms (0.19) is only 59% of ERPT for foreign parties (0.32). In sum, relative
to foreign parties, state-owned or private-owned assembly firms bear similar ERPT while
joint-owned or foreign-owned assembly firms bear lower ERPT.
Several mechanisms may explain this result. First, state-owned assembly firms might
have weak international market networks, thereby bearing more ERPT when they import
materials by themselves. While joint-owned and foreign-owned assembly firms have more
experiences in the international market, thereby bearing less ERPT. Second, state-owned
assembly firm might have better access to bank credit than joint-owned or foreign owned
ones, and thus are less responsive to market. Third, state-owned assembly firms are less
likely to be financially constrained. Therefore, state-owned assembly firms are more able
to bear higher import prices due to exchange rate movements when they take control of
imported inputs purchasing (i.e., engage in IA). Fourth, the invoice of currency can affect
the ERPT (Devereux et al., 2017). Suppose the import price is fixed and the transaction
is invoiced in yuan; then, the ERPT should be close to 0. On the contrary, suppose the
transaction is invoiced in foreign currency; then, the ERPT should be close to 1. If the
invoices of currency are significantly different by ownership, the ERPT will be different.
Owing to data limitations, we cannot discuss this issue in this study. Fifth, the differences in
the types of the product could also explain these results. In Panel C of Table 3 and Figure
2, we show that there are no significant differences between imported goods under the two
processing trade modes. Thus, we believe that financial condition, access to bank credit, and
knowledge of the international market are the main reasons to rational the EPRT differences
among ownership.
5.1.2 Excluding the U.S. Dollar Pegging Countries
From 2000 to 2005, the yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the exchange rate be-
tween China and the United States was fixed. The real exchange rate fluctuation between
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them reflected only the relative CPI fluctuation. Among the top 10 sources of origin, Hong
Kong also pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar. Thus, we exclude the U.S. dollar pegging
countries.15 Panel A of Table 7 presents the results which are very similar to that in the full
sample.
5.1.3 Intermediary Company
In the processing trade, some firms are pure import-export companies that do not produce
any products. These firms provide only services to facilitate transactions between assembly
firms and foreign parties. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish these firms from other ordinary
assembly firms. Following Manova and Yu (2016), we use the keywords in firm names to
identify import-export companies.16 The summary of intermediary companies is presented
in Appendix A.5. In Panle B of Table 7, we exclude all intermediary companies from our
sample. For state-owned assembly firms, the ERPT is now lower in IA mode but insignificant.
A large number of state-owned assembly firms engaged in PA mode import inputs through
intermediary companies. After deleting intermediary companies, the observations of state-
owned assembly firms decrease by 70%. Thus, the ERPT are different between state-owned
import-export companies and state-owned ordinary assembly firms. For assembly firms that
could directly sign contracts with foreign parities, their ERPT is lower. One possible ex-
planation is that these assembly firms have more experiences in the international market,
thereby bearing less ERPT.
5.1.4 Differentiated Goods
The ERPT might be different across products. Here, following the classification from Rauch
(1999), we divide products into two groups: homogeneous and differentiated goods. We
define two dummy variables. Homogeneous is 1 if the product is a homogeneous good;
otherwise, it is 0. Differentiated is 1 if the product is a differentiated good; otherwise, it
is 0. Table 8 presents the results. Our benchmark result remain robust when the imported
inputs are differentiated goods. However, when assembly firms in China import homogeneous
15The U.S. dollar pegging countries (regions) during our sample period include Bahamas, El Salvador,
Hong Kong, Jordan, Malaysia, Panama, Saudi Arabia and United States.
16The keywords that we use are “jingmao,” “jinchukou,” “maoyi,” “kemao,” “waimao,” “jiagongzhuang-
peifuwuggongsi,” “waijingfazhan,” and “duiwaijingjifazhan.”
16
goods, there is no difference between two trade modes. By the classification in Rauch (1999),
homogeneous goods are either traded on an organized exchange or reference priced. The
import prices would be similar regardless of trade modes. Thus, the ERPT is indifferent
between two trade modes.
Above all, we find that ERPT differs depending on whether the assembly firm or its for-
eign party takes the responsibility of input sourcing. In particular, we find strong evidence
that foreign invested assembly firms bear lower ERPT when they source inputs by them-
selves under IA mode. This result is not driven by dollar pegging countries or intermediary
companies. In addition, the ERPT is greater when assembly firms import differentiated
materials.17
6 Exchange Rate Risk and Trade Mode Choice
When assembly firms are risk neutral, they would like input costs (yuan) to be fixed. This
implies that assembly firms prefer the ERPT in import prices (yuan) to be zero when the
exchange rate fluctuates. In this sense, the ERPT measures the exchange rate risks faced by
assembly firms. The higher is the ERPT, the higher is the exchange rate risk. Most assembly
firms in China are financially constrained (Manova and Yu, 2016), and so the fluctuation of
input costs causes liquidity risks for them. Meanwhile assembly firms obtain more profits if
they are engaged in IA mode (Manova and Yu, 2016). Thus, assembly firms face a trade-off.
When assembly firms choose PA mode, they earn less profit. However, in this case, foreign
parties bear exchange rate risks. When assembly firms choose IA mode, they can earn more
profit. However, the disadvantage is that they take on exchange rate risks by themselves.
Thus, the degree of ERPT or exchange rate risks may affect the choice of processing trade
modes.
In previous sections, we show that state-owned assembly firms bear higher ERPT than
foreign parties do but insignificant, while joint-owned and foreign-owned assembly firms bear
significantly less ERPT when they take control of input sourcing. In addition, Table 2
shows that state-owned assembly firms are more engaged in PA mode while joint-owned and
foreign-owned assembly firms prefer IA mode. Combining these two empirical findings, the
17We also find in Appendix A.6 that the ERPT is greater when assembly firms import inputs from developed
countries
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exchange rate risk might be a potential explanation for the trade mode choices of assembly
firms in China. Thus, this study provides a potential explanation for the trade mode choices
of assembly firms in China from the perspective of exchange rate risks.
To verify this mechanism, we investigate whether the exchange rate risks faced by assem-
bly firms would affect their trade mode choice using the firm-year level data. The regression
specification is as follows:
PRkt = β0 + β1ERRkt−1 + ρc + φs + λt + kt (3)
Here, PRkt is the value share of PA mode, that is PA/(PA+IA), for firm k in year t. If
PRkt is 1, it implies that firm k is only engaged in PA mode. If PRkt is 0, it implies that
firm k is only engaged in IA mode. Higher is PRkt, the value share in PA mode is higher.
ERRkt−1 is the exchange rate risk faced by firm k in year t − 1. We use lagged exchange
rate fluctuations to avoid the simultaneous problem. ρc is the prefecture fixed effect, φs is
the industry fixed effect and λt is the year fixed effect. The industry that an assembly firm
belongs to is defined at the HS2 level. We use the export products to define assembly firms’
industry instead of imported products. Since an assembly firm might export products at
multiple HS2 categories, we use its main HS2 category, in which the export value share is
larger than 50% of all export values. Some firms export products in multiple industries and
do not have a HS2 code that comprises at least 50% of all export values. We regard these
firms as ones with unidentified industry and drop them from our sample.18
The key explanatory variable in regression (3) is the firm level exchange rate risk ERRkt.
Following Chit et al. (2010), we first define a proxy for exchange rate volatility, Vjt, for
country j in year t.
Vjt =
√√√√ 11∑
m=0
(∆ ln(RERjt,(−m−1,−m)) − ∆ ln(RERjt,(−m−1,−m)))2
11
(4)
Here, ∆ ln(RERjt,(−m−1,−m)) is the first difference of the log monthly exchange rate in year
t and m represents the month. Thus, in each year t, we have twelve ∆ ln(RERjt,(m−1,m))s.
18The export values of these firms account for about 20% of all export values. We also use HS2 code that
comprises the highest export value to represent the industry for firms as a robustness check. The results are
presented in Appendix A.7.
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Then we use their standard deviation to proxy the exchange rate volatility in year t. The
higher is Vjt, the exchange rate risk is higher when firms import inputs from country j in year
t. Since firm k could import inputs from multiple countries, we use the ratio of import value
from each country to total import value as the weight to construct the weighted exchange
rate risk for each firm k. The definition of ERRkt−1 is
ERRkt−1 =
∑
j∈J
Wjkt−1 × Vjt−1 (5)
In order to solve the endogeneity problem, we use the import weight from country j for firm
k in year t − 1, Wjkt−1, and exchange rate volatility between import source country j and
China in year t− 1, Vjt−1.19 J is the set of source of countries. If our argument is correct, β1
should be positive.
The benchmark result is shown in Panel A of Table 9. When assembly firms in China face
higher exchange rate risks in previous year, the value share of PA mode is higher (column 1).
Columns 2 to 4 show that this pattern remain robust across ownership. The exception is the
state-owned assembly firms. Although the coefficient is positive but insignificant (column
2). State-owned assembly firms is less sensitive to exchange rate risk. We also present the
beta coefficient of ERR−1.20 When ERR−1 increase one standard deviation, the share of
PA mode will increase by 0.05 standard deviation. The standard deviation of PA ratio in
full sample is 0.41. Thus, when exchange rate risk, ERR, increase one standard deviation,
the PA ratio would increase by 2%. Considering the average PA ratio is 24%, the effect of
exchange rate risk on mode choice is economically significant.
Intermediary companies provide only intermediary services between assembly firms and
foreign parties. Thus, exchange rate risks may have different effects on the value share of
PA mode for these companies. We remove all intermediary companies and present results in
Panel B of Table 9. The coefficients are similar with benchmark results. Finally, we redefine
ERR−1 using exchange rate fluctuation of last six months instead of last year. Panel C of
Table 8 shows that our benchmark pattern remain robust with this alternative measurement.
19One shortage of this measurement is that some firms were inactive in importing inputs in previous year
and thus we cannot construct ERRt−1 for these firms. All observations in 2000 (the first year in our data)
and some observations in following years are dropped.
20The beta coefficient standardizes the OLS coefficient to capture the change in standard deviation units
of the dependent variable in response to a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable.
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In sum, empirical results verify our argument and show that assembly firms have a higher
probability of choosing PA mode when exchange rate risks in the previous period are larger.
6.1 Local Financial Development
In this section, we examine how local financial development would affect the relationship
between exchange rate risk and trade mode choice. When firms are located in financially de-
veloped prefectures, they receive two potential benefits. First, they can access more financial
tools to hedge against exchange rate fluctuations. Financial hedging is a substitute strategy
with direct ERPT (Bartram et al., 2010). Second, the developed financial sector is helpful
for decreasing the borrowing costs of firms. Thus, these firms have less financial constraints.
Unconstrained importing firms can bear higher exchange rate risks (Strasser, 2013). Based on
these two channels, higher local financial development would weaken the impact of exchange
rate risks on trade mode choice. We examine this argument in the following regression:
PRkt = γ0 + γ1ERRkt−1 × FinDc + γ2ERRkt−1 + Zct + ρc + φs + λt + kt (6)
Here, FinDc is loans/GDP at the prefecture level, which measures local financial develop-
ment. All other variables are the same as that of regression (3). Note that the pure effect
of local financial development on mode choice is absorbed by the prefecture fixed effect. In
Zct, we control other characteristics at the prefecture level: GDP and GDP per capita. The
coefficient we are interested in is γ1, which should be negative.
The results are shown in Table 10. The Panel A shows that only for foreign-owned
assembly firms, high local financial development could weaken the impact of exchange rate
risks. For other types of assembly firms, located in financially developed prefectures is not
helpful. In China, Beijing and Shanghai are two special cities. The four largest state-owned
banks in China are located in Beijing while more than half foreign-owned banks in China
are located in Shanghai. Thus, we remove Beijing and Shanghai and present results in
Panel B. Column 1 shows high local financial development is helpful to weaken the impact
of exchange rate risks for all firm. However, this result is mainly driven by joint-owned
and foreign-owned assembly firms. Finally, as shown in Table 3, most assembly firms are
located in coastal provinces. Thus, we present the result in this sub-sample (Panel C). The
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coefficients remain robust. In sum, we find that the effect of exchange rate risks could be
mitigated by better local financial development. But this pattern only holds for joint-owned
and foreign-owned assembly firms.
6.2 Industrial Liquidity Constraint
We further investigate how liquidity constraint at the industry level could exaggerate ex-
change rate risks and affect import mode choices. We hypothesize that firms in industries
of higher liquidity needs are more responsive to exchange rate fluctuations and thus more
likely to engage in PA mode. We use the following empirical specification with an interaction
between exchange rate fluctuation (ERR) and liquidity constraints (LQ),
PRkt = θ0 + θ1ERRkt−1 × LQs + θ2ERRkt−1 + Zct + ρc + φs + λt + kt (7)
Here, LQs captures the degree of liquidity constraint firms in industry s face. Note that the
pure effect of liquidity constraint on mode choice is absorbed by the industry fixed effect.
The regression results are shown in Table 11. For firms with average liquidity index of 0.13,
the combined coefficient on ERR is positive, indicating that larger exchange rate fluctuations
lead to higher probability of using PA mode.21 The positive and significant interaction term
suggests that this effect becomes more pronounced for firms in industries with higher liquidity
constraints. This result is robust across different ownerships. Our results are consistent with
findings in Manova and Yu (2016). They demonstrate that firms with better financial health
are associated with higher IA share among processing trade. In other words, firms facing
liquidity constrains will be more likely to engage in PA mode. We provide further evidence
that financial conditions of assembly firms affects their mode choices depending on potential
exchange rate risks they face.
7 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of exchange rates movements on import prices and its
relationship with trade mode choices of assembly firms in China. First, we find that ERPT
21The share of industries with negative overall sign on ERR responses accounts only 4.5%.
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depends on the entity who takes the responsibility of input source. Relative to foreign parties,
state-owned or private-owned assembly firms bear higher but insignificant ERPT while joint-
owned and foreign-owned assembly firms bear less ERPT. Second, we find that the ERPT
is greater when assembly firms import differentiated materials. Thus, when we estimate the
aggregate impact of exchange rate shocks, we should take into account the heterogeneous
effects across firm ownership, sources of origin and types of product.
Then, we argue that the differences in ERPT may reflect different risks. We used exchange
risks to explain the fact that state-owned assembly firms are more engaged in PA mode while
joint-owned and foreign-owned assembly firms prefer IA mode. When the exchange rate
risks are higher, assembly firms have higher possibility to choose PA mode. In addition, we
find that higher local financial development could weaken this effect while higher industrial
liquidity constraint could strengthen it. This paper points out an important friction for
Chinese assembly firms: Exchange rate risks. The ability to bear exchange risks depends on
financial conditions and affects input sourcing initiatives. Since independence input sourcing
usually leads to higher profitability, policies trying to facilitate assembly firms should aim to
improve their financial conditions.
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Table 1: Firm Number and Import Value by Trade Modes
Year Trade Mode Firm Number Share1 Import Value2 Share3
2000 Only PA 4,849 14.57% 96 12.55%
Only IA 24,259 72.90% 457 59.74%
Both PA and IA 4,167 12.53% 212 27.71%
Either PA or IA 33,275 100% 765 100%
2001 Only PA 5,549 15.97% 102 12.11%
Only IA 24,631 70.90% 506 60.10%
Both PA and IA 4,560 13.13% 234 27.79%
Either PA or IA 34,740 100% 842 100%
2002 Only PA 6,260 17.13% 90 9.43%
Only IA 25,788 70.55% 609 63.84%
Both PA and IA 4,502 12.32% 255 26.73%
Either PA or IA 36,550 100% 954 100%
2003 Only PA 6,943 17.38% 175 13.06%
Only IA 28,279 70.79% 926 69.10%
Both PA and IA 4,728 11.83% 239 17.84%
Either PA or IA 39,950 100% 1,340 100%
2004 Only PA 7,819 17.70% 238 13.05%
Only IA 31,013 70.20% 1260 69.08%
Both PA and IA 5,346 12.10% 326 17.87%
Either PA or IA 44,178 100% 1,824 100%
2005 Only PA 8,683 18.27% 281 12.66%
Only IA 33,359 70.19% 1,530 68.95%
Both PA and IA 5,483 11.54% 408 18.39%
Either PA or IA 47,525 100% 2,219 100%
2006 Only PA 8,916 18.39% 449 17.66%
Only IA 34,219 70.56% 1,760 69.24%
Both PA and IA 5,357 11.05% 333 13.10%
Either PA or IA 48,492 100% 2,542 100%
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This table shows the firm numbers and import values by the trade modes.
1. The share is measured by the firm number ratio between the sub-sample (only PA, only IA, both PA and IA,
either PA or IA) and the full sample.
2. The import value is the total import value of firms in the sub-sample and the unit is in billion yuan.
3. The share is measured by the value ratio between the sub-sample (only PA, only IA, both PA and IA, either
PA or IA) and the full sample.
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Table 2: Ownership and Trade Mode
Year Ownership Value1 Share Value1 Share
PA IA
2000 State-owned 151 76.54% 46.4 23.46%
Private-owned 0.24 27.50% 0.62 72.50%
Joint-owned 40 16.02% 210 83.98%
Foreign-owned 39.6 12.51% 277 87.49%
2001 State-owned 161 76.77% 48.6 23.23%
Private-owned 0.68 30.19% 1.56 69.81%
Joint-owned 42.9 16.88% 211 83.12%
Foreign-owned 52.6 14.00% 323 86.00%
2002 State-owned 165 77.59% 47.6 22.41%
Private-owned 2.34 36.61% 4.05 63.39%
Joint-owned 35.8 13.99% 220 86.01%
Foreign-owned 62.2 12.98% 417 87.02%
2003 State-owned 165 74.25% 57.3 25.75%
Private-owned 21.4 68.88% 9.67 31.12%
Joint-owned 38.4 11.79% 288 88.21%
Foreign-owned 91.0 11.98% 668 88.02%
2004 State-owned 184 71.60% 73.0 28.40%
Private-owned 35.6 67.15% 17.4 32.85%
Joint-owned 47.8 11.51% 368 88.49%
Foreign-owned 168 15.29% 929 84.71%
2005 State-owned 188 68.47% 86.6 31.53%
Private-owned 43.1 61.24% 27.3 38.76%
Joint-owned 49.9 10.86% 410 89.14%
Foreign-owned 256 18.07% 1,160 81.93%
2006 State-owned 190 66.66% 95.2 33.34%
Private-owned 48.4 57.34% 36.0 42.66%
Joint-owned 56.0 11.37% 437 88.64%
Foreign-owned 283 16.81% 1,400 83.19%
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This table shows the values by ownership and trade modes.
1. The unit is in billion yuan.
2. The share is either PA/(PA+IA) or IA/(PA+IA) under each ownership structure.
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Table 3: Source of Origin, Firm Location and Product by Trade Mode
PA IA
Panel A: Source of Origin Share
Taiwan 21.83% Japan 18.58%
Japan 17.01% Taiwan 18.45%
South Korea 16.37% South Korea 13.53%
Mainland China 11.26% Mainland China 12.96%
Hong Kong 5.70% United States 5.16%
United States 4.83% Hong Kong 4.72%
Others 23.00% Others 26.63%
Panel B: Firm Location Share1
Guangdong 52.51% Guangdong 44.94%
Jiangsu 22.00% Jiangsu 16.64%
Shanghai 7.91% Shanghai 13.31%
Shandong 6.55% Tianjin 4.63%
Liaoning 2.80% Shandong 4.54%
Zhejiang 2.14% Fujian 3.83%
Fujian 2.02% Liaoning 3.53%
Tianjin 1.44% Zhejiang 3.00%
Others 2.63% Others 5.58%
Panel C: Product Variety Share2
Electrical machinery and equipment
(chapter 85)
32.36% Electrical machinery and equipment
(chapter 85)
45.53%
Optical, photographic, cinemato-
graphic (chapter 90)
10.58% Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery
and mechanical appliances (chapter
84)
9.73%
Plastics (chapter 39) 9.24% Optical, photographic, cinemato-
graphic (chapter 90)
8.33%
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery
and mechanical appliances (chapter
84)
3.83% Plastics (chapter 39) 6.96%
Others 43.99% Others 29.45%
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This table shows the source of origin, firm locations and product categories by the trade modes.
1. The location is at the province level, which include 32 provinces in Mainland China.
2. The product is at the HS2 level, which include 97 kinds of product categories.
3. The share is measured by the value ratio between the sub-sample and the full sample.
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Table 4: Summary of Financial Data
Panel A: Local Financial Development
Mean 0.88 Std. Dev. 0.44
Top Cities Bottom Cities
Beijing 3.29 Daqing 0.18
Xining 3.02 Kelamayi 0.23
Wurumuqi 2.38 Chongzuo 0.33
Yinchuan 2.38 Hezhou 0.33
Haikou 2.25 Jieyang 0.36
Panel B: Industry Liquidity Constraint
Mean 0.13 Std. Dev. 0.04
Top Industries Bottom Industries
Tobacco Products 0.24 Printing and Publishing 0.04
Leather and Leather Products 0.17 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 0.05
Primary Metal Industries 0.17 Chemicals and Allied Products 0.09
Data Sources: The “China City Statistical Yearbook” and “U.S. Compustat”.
Table 5: ERPT and Trade Mode
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term Long-term
∆ ln(RER) -0.0145 -0.0302 -0.2227*** -0.2629***
(-1.114) (-1.218) (8.92) (6.87)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0261 0.0681
(0.923) (1.62)
Trade Mode 0.00155 0.00153 0.00152 0.00147
(1.631) (1.562) (1.579) (1.392)
Observations 12,808,500 12,808,500 12,808,500 12,808,500
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the ERPT in import prices.
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode,
then it is 0, and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and
China. An increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. The short-term ERPT means the response to the current month; the long-term ERPT means the response
to the current and last three months.
4. F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER) and ∆ ln(RER)×Trade Mode, and t-statistics in parentheses
for other variables. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 6: ERPT and Trade Mode By Ownership
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term Long-term
Panel A: State-owned
∆ ln(RER) 0.0121 0.0149 -0.1262 -0.0927
(0.545) (0.615) (2.42) (2.03)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode -0.0191 -0.2268
(-0.283) (1.76)
Trade Mode 0.00203 0.00205 0.00202 0.00216
(1.084) (1.106) (1.077) (1.270)
Observations 2,536,094 2,536,094 2,536,094 2,536,094
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Panel B: Private-owned
∆ ln(RER) -0.0713 -0.121 -0.3339*** -0.2907**
(-1.076) (-1.570) (8.04) (5.04)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.217** -0.2072
(2.158) (0.62)
Trade Mode -0.00686** -0.00721** -0.00683** -0.00688**
(-2.371) (-2.622) (-2.359) (-2.159)
Observations 411,180 411,180 411,180 411,180
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Panel C: Joint-owned
∆ ln(RER) 0.0198 -0.0361 -0.2978*** -0.5195***
(0.896) (-1.292) (11.24) (8.04)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0792*** 0.3159**
(3.908) (4.52)
Trade Mode -0.000109 -0.000254 -0.000204 -0.000701
(-0.0504) (-0.115) (-0.0926) (-0.273)
Observations 3,015,715 3,015,715 3,015,715 3,015,715
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Panel D: Foreign-owned
∆ ln(RER) -0.0418** -0.0803** -0.2216*** -0.3165***
(-2.300) (-2.312) (-9.52) (6.89)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0495 0.1258*
(1.584) (3.29)
Trade Mode 0.00294*** 0.00293*** 0.00292*** 0.00294***
(3.065) (3.143) (3.060) (3.227)
Observations 6,835,528 6,835,528 6,835,528 6,835,528
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the ERPT in import prices by ownership.
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode,
then it is 0, and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and
China. An increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. The short-term ERPT means the response to the current month; the long-term ERPT means the response
to the current and last three months.
4. F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER) and ∆ ln(RER)×Trade Mode, and t-statistics in parentheses for
other variables. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 7: ERPT and Trade Mode Exclude U.S. Dollar Pegging Countries or Interme-
diary
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Exclude U.S. Dollar Pegging Countries
∆ ln(RER) -0.0990 -0.3424** -0.5056*** -0.3110***
(2.39) (4.11) (9.69) (7.04)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode -0.2773 -0.2800 0.3207** 0.1303*
(2.44) (1.30) (5.07) (3.71)
Trade Mode 0.00253 -0.00885 0.000895 0.00366***
(1.123) (-1.454) (0.444) (2.828)
Observations 1,779,978 318,469 2,345,108 5,493,238
R-squared 0.009 0.024 0.008 0.005
Panel B: Exclude Intermediary
∆ ln(RER) -0.1521 -0.3908*** -0.5248*** -0.3169**
(1.08) (7.66) (8.03) (6.84)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.1539 -0.1509 0.3203** 0.1260*
(0.39) (0.36) (4.51) (3.23)
Trade Mode 0.00416 -0.00847 -0.000714 0.00295**
(1.115) (-0.749) (-0.404) (2.506)
Observations 519,783 168,654 3,014,603 6,832,520
R-squared 0.018 0.034 0.007 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the long-term ERPT in import prices excluding U.S. dollar pegging countries.
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode, then it
is 0, and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and China.
An increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER) and ∆ ln(RER)×Trade Mode, and t-statistics in parentheses for other
variables. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 8: ERPT and Product Category
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
∆ ln(RER) × Homogeneous -0.0281 0.0474 -0.2619** -0.2290***
(0.11) (0.13) (4.15) (7.24)
∆ ln(RER) × Homogeneous -0.0114 -0.0709 0.0242 0.0911
× Trade Mode (0.01) (0.11) (0.03) (1.50)
∆ ln(RER) × Differentiated -0.1208* -0.3240** -0.5391** -0.3318**
(3.01) (5.44) (6.69) (6.29)
∆ ln(RER) × Differentiated -0.2581 -0.3388 0.3476** 0.1271*
× Trade Mode (1.54) (1.79) (4.27) (3.21)
Trade Mode 0.002292 -0.007633** -0.00076 0.003248***
(1.40) (-2.35) (-0.30) (4.05)
Observations 2,461,373 398,176 2,925,637 6,623,303
R-squared 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the long-term ERPT in import prices by product category.
1. The product is at the HS6 level.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and China.
An increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3 Homogeneous is 1 if the product is a homogeneous good; otherwise, it is 0. Differentiated is 1 if the product is
a differentiated good; otherwise, it is 0.
4. T-statistics in parentheses for Trade Mode, and F-statistics in parentheses for other variables. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 9: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Benchmark
ERR−1 2.823*** 0.521 3.380*** 3.766*** 2.232***
(0.216) (0.369) (0.789) (0.297) (0.284)
Beta 0.0467 0.00994 0.0442 0.0661 0.0351
Observations 163,506 15,231 8,250 49,996 89,917
R-squared 0.340 0.334 0.345 0.372 0.400
Panel B: Only Non-intermediary Companies
ERR−1 2.931*** 0.661 3.247*** 3.761*** 2.203***
(0.227) (0.470) (0.847) (0.297) (0.283)
Beta 0.0485 0.0128 0.0447 0.0660 0.0347
Observations 154,773 8,448 6,401 49,974 89,828
R-squared 0.354 0.361 0.392 0.372 0.400
Panel C: Only Non-intermediary Companies & Alternative ERR
ERR−1 2.414*** 0.596 3.141*** 2.630*** 1.895***
(0.143) (0.536) (0.872) (0.219) (0.198)
Beta 0.0408 0.0110 0.0441 0.0484 0.0302
Observations 154,648 8,404 6,320 49,972 89,827
R-squared 0.354 0.361 0.394 0.370 0.400
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. Alternative ERR is defined as the exchange rate fluctuation of last six months.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 10: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice: Local Financial Development
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Benchmark
ERR−1 5.334*** 1.072 3.570 6.535*** 4.997***
(0.794) (2.058) (2.529) (1.272) (0.875)
ERR−1× Loans/GDP -1.516** 1.272 -0.225 -1.129 -2.127***
(0.705) (1.838) (2.358) (0.921) (0.703)
ln(GDP) -0.00896 0.0266 -0.240*** -0.0140 -0.00444
(0.00831) (0.0913) (0.0869) (0.0160) (0.00966)
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.00153 0.0144 0.00950 0.00764 -0.00132
(0.00362) (0.0142) (0.0205) (0.00571) (0.00449)
Observations 107,963 4,851 5,701 31,213 66,126
R-squared 0.358 0.354 0.385 0.369 0.397
Panel B: Without Shanghai and Beijing
ERR−1 5.918*** -0.422 4.813 7.153*** 5.823***
(0.765) (2.443) (2.968) (1.527) (0.938)
ERR−1× Loans/GDP -2.461*** 2.490 -1.836 -2.115* -3.371***
(0.672) (2.442) (2.995) (1.262) (0.862)
ln(GDP) -0.0132 0.0139 -0.219** -0.0136 -0.00643
(0.00874) (0.1000) (0.0891) (0.0166) (0.0103)
ln(GDP per Capita) -8.85e-05 0.0149 0.0298 0.00894 -0.00132
(0.00407) (0.0164) (0.0232) (0.00720) (0.00517)
Observations 97,356 4,341 5,282 26,702 60,958
R-squared 0.374 0.361 0.386 0.389 0.417
Panel C: Only Coastal Provinces Exclude Shanghai
ERR−1 6.947*** 1.015 6.641** 8.373*** 5.964***
(0.870) (3.141) (3.154) (1.747) (0.978)
ERR−1× Loans/GDP -3.165*** 1.442 -3.303 -3.099** -3.439***
(0.744) (3.189) (3.150) (1.409) (0.895)
ln(GDP) -0.0100 0.0807 -0.214** -0.0132 -0.00570
(0.00882) (0.125) (0.0942) (0.0170) (0.0103)
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.00207 0.0205 0.0341 0.0118 -0.00112
(0.00427) (0.0201) (0.0245) (0.00775) (0.00526)
Observations 93,094 3,507 4,889 25,082 59,597
R-squared 0.377 0.350 0.382 0.386 0.416
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”, IFS and “China City Statistical Yearbook”.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. We exclude intermediary companies from the sample.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table 11: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice: Industry Liquidity
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
ERR−1 -9.338*** -3.065 -5.023 -10.02*** -9.948***
(1.314) (2.403) (3.910) (1.937) (1.193)
ERR−1 × LQ 86.80*** 23.03 61.41** 98.24*** 86.43***
(9.718) (15.96) (27.63) (13.38) (8.399)
Observations 155,383 8,572 6,351 50,157 90,186
R-squared 0.328 0.285 0.333 0.343 0.383
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”, IFS and “U.S. Compustat”.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. We exclude intermediary companies from the sample.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Figure 1: The Production Chains for the PA and IA trade modes
Notes: This figure shows the production chains for PA and IA modes, respectively. First, the assembly firm in
China signs a production contract with a foreign party. Then, these firms decide which among them is in the charge
of the imported inputs purchasing. In PA mode, the foreign party purchases the inputs and then transfers them to
the assembly firm for free. Although the inputs are free, the foreign party still needs to report the values of these
inputs to Chinese Customs. This is the “import price” observed in the customs data. In IA mode, an assembly
firm in China purchases inputs by itself. After processing these inputs, the assembly firm either returns or sells the
value-added good to the foreign party. This is the “export price” observed in the customs data.
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Figure 2: The Distribution Across Imported Product Varieties
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of imported product varieties within the “electrical machinery and equip-
ment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers,
and parts and accessories of such articles” category (Chapter 85). Within this category, there are 290 kinds of
products at the HS6 level. The x-axis is the product variety and the y-axis is the import value share of the product.
The correlation of these shares between two trade modes is 0.97.
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Figure 3: The Real and Nominal Exchange Rates with Main Trade Partners
Data Sources: The “IFS Database”.
Notes: This figure shows the nominal and real exchange rates between China and its main trade partners.
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A Appendix
A.1 ERPT in Export Prices
In this section, we investigate the ERPT in export prices. The regression specification is as
follows:
∆ ln(Pijk(t−1,t)) = α0+
3∑
h=0
α1h∆ ln(RERj(t−h−1,t−h))+α2 Modeijkt+µij+ηk+λt+ijkt (A1)
Here, Pijkt is the export price (yuan) of product i to country j for firm k at time t. RERjt
is the real exchange rate between country j and China at time t. Modeijkt is a dummy for
the trade mode. If the product is traded under PA mode, then Modeijkt is 0, and otherwise
1. µij measures the product-country fixed effect, ηk measures the firm fixed effect and λt
measures the time fixed effect. We take both export prices and real exchange rates in the
first difference of log forms.
∑3
h=0 α1h measures the long-term ERPT and is supposed to be
negative. When Chinese yuan appreciates, the export price (yuan) should be decrease. In
processing trade, the export price is decided when the contract is signed, after which the
inputs are imported. Thus, we suspect that the ERPT in export prices would be lower than
that in import prices. Table A1 presents the results. When Chinese yuan appreciates by
10%, the export price decreases by 0.9% (column 1). Compared with the ERPT in import
prices (Table 5), this coefficient is smaller and insignificant. Li et al. (2015a) also investigate
the ERPT in export prices using both ordinary and processing trade data. Their regression
is at the firm-product-country-year level. They find that, with a 10% appreciation of Chinese
yuan, export price drops by 0.35%. The coefficient in their paper is even smaller than ours.
The difference might come from trade mode or time frequency.
A.2 ERPT in Import Prices, Cluster by Country-Month
The key explanatory variable of regression (2) is the real exchange rate, which is measured
at the country-month level. In the main text, we cluster the standard errors by country.
In this section, we re-run regression (2) for each ownership type and cluster the standard
errors by country-month as a robustness check. The results in Table A2 are similar to that
in Tables 5 and 6. Thus, our benchmark results are robust. That is, relative to foreign
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Table A1: ERPT in Export Prices
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
∆ ln(RER) -0.0914 -0.0663 -0.0512 -0.1568 -0.0800
(1.99) (1.96) (0.39) (2.13) (1.7)
Trade Mode -0.000256 -0.000710 -0.000138 0.00410** -0.00125
(-0.34) (-0.71) (-0.08) (2.05) (-0.92)
Observations 7,968,253 1,953,081 345,260 1,777,269 3,878,847
R-squared 0.009 0.010 0.029 0.017 0.011
Product-Country FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the long-term ERPT in export prices.
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode, then it is 0,
and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the export destination and China.
An increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER), and t-statistics in parentheses for Trade Mode. *Significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
parties, state-owned and private-owned assembly firms bear higher ERPT but insignificant
while joint-owned and foreign-owned assembly firms bear lower ERPT.
A.3 Bilateral Exchange Rate and Exchange Rate Between U.S.
Dollar and Chinese Yuan
Boz et al. (2017) emphasizes the role of U.S. dollar exchange rate rather than bilateral
exchange rate in price pass-through. Most trade flow in China is invoiced in U.S. dollar. In
order to investigate which one is more important, bilateral exchange rate or exchange rate
between U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan, we include both exchange rates in our estimation.
The regression specification is as follows:
∆ ln(Pijk(t−1,t)) = α0 +
3∑
h=0
α1h∆ ln(RERj(t−h−1,t−h)) +
3∑
h=0
α2h∆ ln(RERu(t−h−1,t−h))
+ α3 Modeijkt + µij + ηk + λt + ijkt
(A2)
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Table A2: ERPT in Import Prices, Cluster by Country-Month
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Short-term Long-term
Panel A: Full Sample
∆ ln(RER) -0.0145 -0.0302 -0.2227*** -0.2629***
(-0.639) (-0.923) (31.19) (19.94)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0261 0.0681
(0.898) (1.69)
Trade Mode 0.00155 0.00153 0.00152 0.00147
(0.954) (0.939) (0.932) (0.909)
Observations 12,808,500 12,808,500 12,808,500 12,808,500
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Panel B: State-owned
∆ ln(RER) 0.0121 0.0149 -0.1262* -0.0927
(0.34) (0.45) (3.44) (1.82)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode -0.0191 -0.2268
(-0.16) (1.17)
Trade Mode 0.00203 0.00205 0.00202 0.00216
(0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.55)
Observations 2,536,094 2,536,094 2,536,094 2,536,094
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Panel C: Private-owned
∆ ln(RER) -0.0713 -0.121 -0.3339* -0.2907
(-0.799) (-1.285) (3.25) (2.16)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.217 -0.2072
(1.297) (0.43)
Trade Mode -0.00686 -0.00721 -0.00683 -0.00688
(-0.829) (-0.875) (-0.826) (-0.837)
Observations 411,180 411,180 411,180 411,180
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Panel D: Joint-owned
∆ ln(RER) 0.0198 -0.0361 -0.2978*** -0.5195***
(0.564) (-0.462) (23.53) (15.88)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0792 0.3159**
(1.003) (5.30)
Trade Mode -0.000109 -0.000254 -0.000204 -0.000701
(-0.0346) (-0.0795) (-0.0645) (-0.224)
Observations 3,015,715 3,015,715 3,015,715 3,015,715
R-squared 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Panel E: Foreign-owned
∆ ln(RER) -0.0418 -0.0803 -0.2216*** -0.3165***
(-1.610) (-1.490) (22.38) (-11.82)
∆ ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.0495 0.1258
(0.954) (1.89)
Trade Mode 0.00294 0.00293 0.00292 0.00294
(1.190) (1.187) (1.178) (1.190)
Observations 6,835,528 6,835,528 6,835,528 6,835,528
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country-Month X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes:
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode, then it is 0,
and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and China. An
increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. The short-term ERPT means the response to the current month; the long-term ERPT means the response to the
current and last three months.
4. Robust F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER) and ∆ ln(RER)×Trade Mode, and t-statistics in parentheses for other
variables. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table A3: ERPT in Import Prices: Bilateral and US Exchange Rates
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
∆ ln(Bilateral RER) -0.2908*** -0.2190*** -0.3729*** -0.3805*** -0.2698***
(12.37) (7.74) (12.25) (13.35) (13.80)
∆ ln(US RER) 0.0193 0.0078 -0.5469* 0.0318 0.0404
(0.03) (0.00) (3.50) (0.01) (0.20)
Observations 12,808,500 2,536,094 411,180 3,015,715 6,835,528
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the long-term ERPT in import prices.
1. The product is at the HS6 level.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and China. An
increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. F-statistics in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Here, Pijkt is the import price (yuan) of product i from country j for firm k at time t.
RERjt is the real exchange rate between country j and China at time t. RERut is the real
exchange rate between US and China at time t. Modeijkt is a dummy for the trade mode.
If the product is traded under PA mode, then Modeijkt is 0, and otherwise 1. µij measures
the product-country fixed effect, ηk measures the firm fixed effect and λt measures the time
fixed effect. Since RERut only has time variation, we control month fixed effect instead of
year-month fixed effect. The result is presented in Table A3. When we include both bilateral
and U.S. dollar exchange rates, only the former is significant. This finding based on firm
information is different from what Boz et al. (2017) observe using country level aggregates.
Our results suggest that the bilateral exchange rate plays a more important role on pass-
through rather than the invoice currency in Chinese processing trade. Thus, we focus on the
bilateral exchange rate in this study.
A.4 Real Exchange Rate Decomposition
The sources of real exchange rate movements can come from either nominal exchange rate
fluctuations or relative CPI changes. Thus, we decompose the real exchange rate into two
parts: the nominal exchange rate and the relative CPI, and investigate which plays a larger
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Table A4: RER Decomposition: NER and Relative CPI
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
∆ ln(NER) -0.2290*** -0.1313* -0.2835** -0.3060*** -0.2293***
(9.83) (2.93) (5.16) (12.26) (10.48)
∆ ln(Relative CPI) 0.0911 -0.1003 0.8132* 0.1191 0.1128
(0.62) (0.34) (3.07) (0.39) (1.09)
Observations 12,808,500 2,536,094 411,180 3,015,715 6,835,528
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.005
Product-Country FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the decomposition of ERPT in import prices.
1. The product is at the HS6 level.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate between the source of origin and China.
An increase in the nominal exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. An increase in the relative CPI implies the inflation is higher in China.
4. F-statistics in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
role. The regression specification is as follows:
∆ ln(Pijk(t−1,t)) = α0 +
3∑
h=0
α1h∆ ln(NERj(t−h−1,t−h)) +
3∑
h=0
α2h∆(CPIChina/CPIj)t−1,t
+ α3 Modeijkt + µij + ηk + λt + ijkt
(A3)
Here, Pijkt is the import price (yuan) of product i from country j for firm k at time t. NERjt
is the nominal exchange rate between country j and China at time t. (CPIChina/CPIj)t is the
relative CPI between China and country j at time t. Modeijkt is a dummy for the trade mode.
If the product is traded under PA mode, then Modeijt is 0, and otherwise 1. The result is
presented in Table A4. When nominal exchange rate appreciates, the price decreases. When
the relative CPI in China is higher, the price increases but insignificant. Thus, price changes
are mainly driven by nominal exchange rate changes compared to relative CPI change.22
22The coefficient of relative CPI changes is positive and significant only for private-owned assembly firms
which may suggest that firms of different ownership have different source location preferences for their
imported inputs.
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A.5 Summary of Intermediary Companies
In this section, we present some facts about intermediary companies in processing trade.
Panel A of Table A5 shows that the number of intermediary companies remains stable from
2000 to 2006. In 2000, the share of intermediary companies was 7.79%, and this decreased
slightly to 7.27% in 2006. However, the total values imported by intermediary companies
decreased significantly. In 2000, intermediary companies imported around 20% of total goods
but in 2006, these firms imported only 8.4% of total goods. This finding implies that the role
of intermediary companies is in decline. Some assembly firms no longer need intermediary
services and can directly establish connections with foreign parties.
Panels B and C show that intermediary companies differ from non-intermediary companies
in processing trade modes. Around 82% of non-intermediary companies were engaged in
IA mode in 2006 and the import value was more than 77%. Only 73% of intermediary
companies were engaged in IA mode and the total value was less than 25%. This finding
implies that firms that cooperate with intermediary companies prefer to participate in PA
mode. Some small firms cannot directly receive orders from foreign parties, and intermediary
companies can supply such matching services. At the same time, these small firms do not
have international market networks or cannot bear the exchange rate risks, and thus, they
are engaged only in PA mode.
Table A6 shows the import value share of ownership for both non-intermediary and in-
termediary companies. Before 2003, state-owned intermediary companies import over 99%
inputs in terms of values. In September 2003, China began to relax the regulation on direct
trade rights and the capital requirement to become a intermediary company decreased from
five million yuan to one million yuan. Thus, the value share by private-owned intermedi-
ary jumped in 2003. The value shares of joint-owned and foreign-owned intermediary are
negligible.
A.6 Source of Origin
Existing studies (Manova and Zhang, 2012) argue that the quality of product is different
across countries and the bargaining position of assembly firms also may vary across countries.
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Table A5: Summary of Intermediary and Non-intermediary Companies
Share of Firm Number Value1
Panel A: Full Sample
Year Non-Intermediary Intermediary Non-Intermediary Intermediary
2000 92.21% 7.79% 611 154
2001 92.33% 7.67% 679 163
2002 92.88% 7.12% 788 166
2003 93.08% 6.92% 1,160 183
2004 93.01% 6.99% 1,610 210
2005 94.19% 5.81% 2,010 210
2006 92.73% 7.27% 2,330 214
Panel B: Non-Intermediary
Year PA IA PA IA
2000 24.56% 85.80% 162 555
2001 26.75% 84.30% 181 618
2002 27.30% 83.04% 187 719
2003 27.12% 83.06% 240 1,060
2004 27.82% 82.71% 369 1,500
2005 28.33% 81.93% 494 1,860
2006 27.49% 82.24% 582 2,030
Panel C: Intermediary
Year PA IA PA IA
2000 57.15% 81.06% 146 114
2001 57.38% 80.74% 155 122
2002 57.43% 80.71% 159 144
2003 57.32% 76.71% 173 103
2004 56.20% 76.92% 195 81.4
2005 55.13% 76.17% 196 77.3
2006 54.37% 73.42% 201 66.3
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This table shows the summary of intermediary and non-intermediary companies.
1. The unit is in billion yuan.
2. Since a assembly firm in China can be engaged in both trade modes, the sum of shares of PA and IA modes is larger
than 1.
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Table A6: Intermediary Companies and Ownership
Share of Value
Year State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Non-Intermediary
2000 7.23% 0.12% 40.79% 51.85%
2001 6.92% 0.30% 37.43% 55.35%
2002 6.02% 0.66% 32.51% 60.82%
2003 5.12% 1.01% 28.19% 65.67%
2004 4.91% 1.32% 25.75% 68.01%
2005 4.93% 1.81% 22.84% 70.42%
2006 4.90% 1.80% 21.14% 72.15%
Panel B: Intermediary
2000 99.75% 0.06% 0.13% 0.06%
2001 99.66% 0.13% 0.14% 0.06%
2002 99.12% 0.74% 0.09% 0.06%
2003 89.29% 10.58% 0.04% 0.09%
2004 84.79% 15.1% 0.03% 0.08%
2005 83.67% 16.17% 0.02% 0.14%
2006 79.88% 19.86% 0.01% 0.25%
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”.
Notes: This table shows the import value share of ownership for both non-intermediary and intermediary
companies.
Thus, we divide sources of origin into two groups: developed and developing countries.23
Then, we investigate the ERPT for these two groups. Table A7 shows that the result is
robust for developed countries and the coefficient of ERPT is insignificant for developing
countries. This means that the exchange rate risk is almost zero for assembly firms in China
and there is no significant difference between the two trade modes. One possibility is that
assembly firms in China have a strong bargaining position when they import inputs from
developing countries.
A.7 Alternative Industry Classification
In the main text, we use the HS2 code that comprises at least 50% of all export values to
classify the industry that a firm belongs to. We drop those firms that do not have any HS2
code that is at least 50% of all export values. The export values of these dropped firms
account for about 20% of all export values. In order to solve the sample selection concern,
23The developed countries (regions) include 34 OECD countries plus Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
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Table A7: ERPT in Import Prices: Source of Origin
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln(Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Developed Countries
ln(RER) -0.1030 -0.1865 -0.5298*** -0.3562***
(1.92) (2.24) (7.71) (7.63)
ln(RER) × Trade Mode -0.2240 -0.3023 0.2964* 0.1210*
(1.93) (1.36) (3.62) (2.90)
Trade Mode 0.00214 -0.00685* -0.000459 0.00319***
(1.24) (-1.80) (-0.17) (3.70)
Observations 2,267,595 360,266 2,752,931 6,172,677
R-squared 0.007 0.024 0.007 0.005
Panel B: Developing Countries
ln(RER) -0.1259 -0.8178*** -0.5087 0.0470
(0.64) (15.57) (1.05) (0.05)
ln(RER) × Trade Mode 0.2415 0.6914 0.4237 -0.0730
(0.64) (2.54) (0.87) (0.14)
Trade Mode -0.00958 -0.00730* -0.00893** 0.00147
(-0.89) (-1.71) (-2.55) (0.40)
Observations 268,086 50,643 261,874 661,275
R-squared 0.012 0.024 0.014 0.009
Product-Country FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Time FE X X X X
Cluster By Country X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the long-term ERPT in import prices by source of origin.
1. The product is at the HS6 level. The trade mode is a dummy. If the product is traded under PA mode, then it is 0,
and otherwise 1.
2. The price is in the yuan and the exchange rate is the real exchange rate between the source of origin and China. An
increase in the real exchange rate implies an appreciation of the yuan.
3. The developed countries (regions) include 34 OECD countries plus Hong Kong, and Taiwan.
4. F-statistics in parentheses for ∆ ln(RER) and ∆ ln(RER)×Trade Mode, and t-statistics in parentheses for other
variables. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table A8: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Benchmark
ERR−1 2.759*** 0.333 3.265*** 3.740*** 2.214***
(0.211) (0.354) (0.786) (0.292) (0.279)
Beta 0.0452 0.00605 0.0422 0.0656 0.0348
Observations 169,752 17,611 8,544 50,891 92,596
R-squared 0.331 0.345 0.335 0.371 0.400
Panel B: Only Non-intermediary Companies
ERR−1 2.893*** 0.524 3.244*** 3.735*** 2.185***
(0.222) (0.467) (0.847) (0.292) (0.278)
Beta 0.0478 0.00987 0.0444 0.0655 0.0343
Observations 158,904 8,933 6,485 50,864 92,504
R-squared 0.351 0.361 0.380 0.371 0.400
Panel C: Only Non-intermediary Companies & Alternative ERR
ERR−1 2.376*** 0.375 3.190*** 2.589*** 1.896***
(0.142) (0.532) (0.871) (0.217) (0.195)
Beta 0.0400 0.00677 0.0445 0.0476 0.0302
Observations 158,768 8,884 6,399 50,862 92,503
R-squared 0.351 0.362 0.382 0.369 0.400
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database” and IFS.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. Alternative ERR is defined as the exchange rate fluctuation of last six months.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
in this section we use another way to classify the industry for firms as a robustness check.
We use the HS2 code that comprises the highest export values to represent the industry for
firms. The results are presented in Tables A8-A10.
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Table A9: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice: Local Financial Development
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
Panel A: Benchmark
ERR−1 5.166*** 0.768 3.558 6.426*** 4.837***
(0.778) (2.053) (2.530) (1.249) (0.859)
ERR−1× Loans/GDP -1.423** 1.324 -0.242 -1.071 -2.020***
(0.696) (1.831) (2.361) (0.909) (0.702)
ln(GDP) -0.00805 -0.0170 -0.218** -0.0107 -0.00326
(0.00823) (0.0884) (0.0921) (0.0157) (0.00947)
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.00102 0.0163 0.00731 0.00746 -0.00167
(0.00358) (0.0141) (0.0204) (0.00565) (0.00443)
Observations 110,772 5,030 5,779 31,758 68,133
R-squared 0.355 0.358 0.372 0.368 0.396
Panel B: Without Shanghai and Beijing
ERR−1 5.865*** -0.416 4.934* 7.156*** 5.758***
(0.751) (2.436) (2.976) (1.502) (0.917)
ERR−1× Loans/GDP -2.503*** 2.130 -2.023 -2.187* -3.373***
(0.663) (2.431) (3.009) (1.246) (0.846)
ln(GDP) -0.0122 -0.0360 -0.195** -0.0109 -0.00494
(0.00867) (0.0960) (0.0946) (0.0163) (0.0101)
ln(GDP per Capita) -0.000621 0.0172 0.0271 0.00798 -0.00149
(0.00403) (0.0164) (0.0232) (0.00713) (0.00509)
Observations 99,962 4,503 5,357 27,183 62,846
R-squared 0.371 0.367 0.372 0.390 0.417
Panel C: Only Coastal Provinces Exclude Shanghai
ERR−1 6.884*** 1.094 6.761** 8.401*** 5.914***
(0.852) (3.135) (3.157) (1.718) (0.955)
ERR−1 × Loans/GDP -3.194*** 0.932 -3.510 -3.187** -3.451***
(0.732) (3.171) (3.159) (1.390) (0.877)
ln(GDP) -0.00951 0.00236 -0.189* -0.0126 -0.00420
(0.00874) (0.117) (0.101) (0.0167) (0.0101)
ln(GDP per Capita) 0.00169 0.0228 0.0307 0.0109 -0.00112
(0.00422) (0.0200) (0.0245) (0.00766) (0.00517)
Observations 95,669 3,663 4,958 25,557 61,471
R-squared 0.374 0.354 0.368 0.386 0.415
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”, IFS and “China City Statistical Yearbook”.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. We exclude intermediary companies from the sample.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Table A10: Exchange Rate Risk and Mode Choice: Industry Liquidity
Dependent Variable: PA Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All State-owned Private-owned Joint-owned Foreign-owned
ERR−1 -9.254*** -3.098 -5.222 -9.894*** -9.801***
(1.295) (2.350) (3.885) (1.910) (1.179)
ERR−1 × LQ 85.91*** 21.85 61.87** 97.29*** 85.17***
(9.574) (15.16) (27.52) (13.21) (8.290)
Observations 158,645 8,881 6,412 50,800 92,438
R-squared 0.325 0.291 0.324 0.342 0.383
Prefecture FE X X X X X
Industry FE X X X X X
Time FE X X X X X
Data Sources: The “Chinese Customs Export and Import Database”, IFS and “U.S. Compustat”.
Notes: This table shows the impact of exchange rate risk on mode choice.
1. We exclude intermediary companies from the sample.
2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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